Often referred to as the greatest peacetime buildup in US history, Ronald Reagan’s military policy continues to elicit much debate. Many scholars question both its wisdom as refutation of the 1970s détente as well as its necessity and efficacy in deterring the Soviet Union. As a catalyst for transformation, Reagan’s military investment certainly paid valuable dividends evidenced by the victory in the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This achievement is especially impressive when contrasted with the state of the armed forces prior to Reagan’s presidency. Nevertheless, a fundamental question persists as to what actually constituted the buildup. Historians frequently refer to the nuclear arsenal and SDI in their analysis of Reagan’s diplomacy with the Soviets particularly as leverage. However, this aspect was only part of the buildup and ignores the equally important, substantial and more enduring conventional force improvements. In the historiography, budgetary outlays are expressed as dollar increases or as a percentage of GDP but without any indication of how the funds were utilized by the Pentagon. Too often, Reagan’s program is presented as an arms race, a sort of tit-for-tat acquisition contest with the Soviets. This interpretation is both misleading and incorrect for it lacks the context which analyzes the rationale, necessity and efficacy of the increased defense funding.
Greater specificity of the impact on the armed forces is needed to better understand the role of the buildup in Reagan’s presidency, the end of the Cold War and American history. These years are part of the post-Vietnam recovery and reformation which included the end of national conscription. Often overlooked now, large questions persisted at the time about the viability of the all-volunteer force and whether it was capable of meeting the nation’s security needs. For most of the Cold War, Americans acquiesced on the Communist manpower advantage. Military professionalism combined with technical and material superiority would be sufficient to defend the west, although nuclear weapons were essential in the calculus of defense.
Conversely, the Reagan administration sought a conventional force capable of defeating Soviet aggression without depending on nuclear weapons. A questionable goal, the buildup, nevertheless, produced the most competent peacetime military in American history. Within its parameters, this study seeks to identify and evaluate the specific elements within the armed forces that achieved this result. Likewise, this dissertation seeks to evaluate the necessity for the buildup and was it worth the investment. As such, the goal is to delineate both the rationale and character in a way that has not been done before. The nuclear aspects of Reagan’s military buildup have been well covered by other scholars, so this research will focus on the conventional forces. To that end, procurement was a key element, but the emphasis will be less material such as training, recruiting, retention, and quality of life for service personnel. Moreover, Reagan’s program required significant public and political support so this facet must be incorporated as well. Due to Reagan’s investment, the American armed forces experienced a radical transformation with a payoff that lasted decades. Upon completion, this dissertation seeks to place the Reagan military program within a context of greater understanding of his presidency, the end of the Cold War, and the United States’ role as a superpower in the late 20th century.
This research requires familiarity with numerous aspects of military, political, and cultural history. As a recipient of a 4-year Army ROTC scholarship in 1991, I had limited experience with some of those elements. During my undergraduate and graduate studies, military history was always a central focus with research on World War II and the Cold War whenever possible. Previous work includes analyses of the origins of the Cold War, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, evaluating Jimmy Carter’s relationship with the Soviets, NATO naval policies in the 1970s and ‘80s, as well as an independent survey of American strategic thought. My master’s thesis was a reevaluation of American armor (tanks) prior to and during World War II titled “War-Winner: A Re-appraisal of the M4 ‘Sherman’ Tank in World War II” and challenged extant historiography. This study developed a personal interest in the correlation between technical developments, acquisition, training, and combat performance. In conjunction with that research, I also presented twice at the Missouri River Valley History Conference on similar topics. Concurrently, I assisted in curating several military history exhibits at the Tennessee State Museum such as a commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. I also had the privilege of chairing a panel of World War II authors at the Southern Festival of Books and presenting a lecture on the strategy of the Vietnam War at Middle Tennessee State University. As a longtime member of the Society for Military Historians, I published a review of Stephen Bourque’s Jayhawk: The VII Corps in the Persian Gulf War for that organization’s journal (April 2004.) This work inspired further interest in discerning how the American military achieved its unprecedented victory. During my 14-year tenure as a high school teacher, I taught advanced placement as well as college preparatory history courses. In developing lectures on warfare from the 15th to the 21st century, both analysis and synthesis of a wide variety of conflicts were necessary for an unfamiliar audience. Complimentary, students always expressed great interest in these “How They fought” series especially those regarding the Cold War and nuclear weapons. This experience prompted a greater desire for a more thorough understanding of military history, especially regarding theories, training, and performance.
The end of the Cold War was as unexpected as it was anticlimactic. For decades, scholars, soldiers, diplomats, and politicians predicated that the conflict would either endure for centuries or end in nuclear holocaust. The fact that neither of these outcomes transpired was and remains a source of great inquiry. Historians need a more complete examination of Ronald Reagan’s military buildup to better understand its role in these events as well its place in shaping American history.
Images (in order of appearance)
White House Photographic Office. “Caspar Weinberger Presents "Soviet Military Power" to President Ronald Reagan in The Oval Office.” March 8, 1983. 75852685. National Archives. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75852685.
White House Photographic Office. “President Ronald Reagan with United States Troops at Camp Liberty Bell The Demilitarized Zone South Korea.” November 12, 1983. 75853135. National Archives. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/75853135.
Department of Defense. Defense Visual Information Center. “A Soviet army observer and his US Army escort watch M1 Abrams main battle tanks on maneuvers during the Confident Enterprise phase of REFORGER/AUTUMN FORGE '83.” September 1, 1983. 6388751. National Archives. https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6388751.
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